Dossiês

Graça e Livre-Arbítrio

Atos humanos, escolha, necessidade da graça e mérito na Prima Secundae.

Introdução pública

O debate sobre graça e liberdade costuma virar slogan. A tradição escolástica oferece distinções mais firmes: o que torna um ato humano, como a vontade escolhe, por que a graça é necessária e como ainda se pode falar de mérito.

Em uma frase

Tomás de Aquino evita dois erros opostos: imaginar que a vontade humana se salva por suas próprias forças, ou que a graça torna a liberdade irrelevante. A graça cura, move e eleva a liberdade para atos verdadeiramente humanos e meritórios.

Mapa bíblico

Notas editoriais sobre cobertura

Jo 15, 5

“Sem mim nada podeis fazer” é uma âncora bíblica para a necessidade da graça, tratada aqui pela Suma.

cobertura limitada

Ef 2, 8-10

Graça, fé e boas obras preparadas por Deus são pano de fundo bíblico para mérito fundado no dom.

lacuna de cobertura

Prévia das fontes7

Santo Tomás de Aquino

Santo Tomás de Aquino · Suma Teológica — Primeira Parte da Segunda Parte · Question. 6 - OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES) · séc. XIII

tradução automática

Suma I-II, q.6 abre o tratado do voluntário e involuntário. A fonte prepara o vocabulário moral necessário para falar de liberdade.

Obra: Suma Teológica — Primeira Parte da Segunda ParteReferência: Question. 6 - OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)Tipo: scholastic_theologyAutoridade: scholarly_referenceUso: full_text_allowed
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Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail. In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts? And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers. And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? (2) Whether in irrational animals? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action? (4) Whether violence can be done to the will? (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness? (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness? (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?

Santo Tomás de Aquino

Santo Tomás de Aquino · Suma Teológica — Primeira Parte da Segunda Parte · Question. 109 - OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES) · séc. XIII

tradução automática

Suma I-II, q.109 é a questão central sobre a necessidade da graça. O dossier a usa para evitar tanto autossuficiência quanto passividade.

Obra: Suma Teológica — Primeira Parte da Segunda ParteReferência: Question. 109 - OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)Tipo: scholastic_theologyAutoridade: scholarly_referenceUso: full_text_allowed
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We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects. The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether without grace man can know anything? (2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good? (3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things? (4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law? (5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace? (7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin? (8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? (9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help? (10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?

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